"American generals were managed very differently in World War Two than they were in subsequent wars," writes Thomas E. Ricks, the former Pentagon correspondent of the Washington Post. "During World War Two, senior American commanders were given a few months in which to succeed, be killed or wounded, or be replaced."
Mr. Ricks rightly puts this policy down to Gen. George C. Marshall, U.S. Army chief of staff from 1939 to 1945 and one of the chief architects of the defeat of the Axis. During World War II, 16 generals were relieved of their command out of the 155 who commanded divisions, as well as no fewer than five corps commanders. By contrast, the most senior soldier to be relieved during the eight years that the United States fought in Iraq after 2003 was a colonel, Joe Dowdy. "As matters stand now," Mr. Ricks quotes another colonel saying, "a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses his part in a war."
It is Mr. Ricks's contentionâ??this is a highly contentious bookâ??that American postwar generalship has been severely substandard not just in recent years but for much of the six decades separating Dwight Eisenhower from David Petraeus. The author writes in an engaging, informed way, but what he says amounts to a caustic assault on American postwar military leadership. He argues that, without the possibility of generals being relieved of command, "the Marshallian approach to leadership"â??emphasizing a relentless expectation of success and unwillingness to accept anything lessâ??"did not work nearly as well, as we were to see in Vietnam and Iraq."
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