Pity the historian of ancient times. Bereft of documents, memoirs, and reminiscences of kings and courtiers alike, he reconstructs events and motivations from hints and fragments. Fortunately, the modern researcher rarely faces such a dilemma since contemporary publishing opportunities and egos produce volumes of recollections even on issues of minor importance. And yet there can be too much of a good thing. The contemporary historian frequently is deluged by sources and recountings pleading for his attention as he practices his craft of historical reconstruction. So is it with one of the most important events of the modern era--the unification of Germany at the end of the last decade.
The studies of this event continue to proliferate as each player, great and small, weighs in with his own unique perspective. A reasoned way to handle this is to construct a common set of problems that confronted each major participant, and then interrogate the memoirs as to how each issue was approached. In this fashion, one can gain some insight into individual motivations and gauge the frustrations and mistakes that accompanied the unification process. And while the particular analyses of this article focus upon the goals and processes of German unification, the essay as a whole confirms Karl Marx's perceptive comment that at least for some, history indeed is made behind the backs of men.
This framework for an examination of German unification involves three crucial questions. First, what steps did each superpower take to ensure close relations with their European allies on the eve of German unification? Clearly, the ability to act decisively and rapidly in a changing situation depended greatly upon American relations with NATO and Soviet ties with the Warsaw Pact. Second, as the possibility of German unification emerged in the summer of 1989, what steps did each superpower take to ensure its interests in Germany's future would be protected? This problem can best be explored by examining how the unique "Two plus Four" forum emerged and evolved as the central locus of negotiating the domestic conditions on unification. And last, but surely not least, what allowed the Western demand for continued German participation in NATO to win the day?
This article concentrates on the memoirs from the three most important countries: the United States, Germany, and the USSR. The Americans are represented by then-Secretary of State James Baker,[4] Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock,[5] and the memoirs of two important members of the National Security Council with responsibilities for the USSR and Germany, Condoleezza Rice and Philip Zelikow.[6] The German view is expressed in the lengthy memoirs of then-Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher,[7] West German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble,[8] and West German Security Adviser Horst Teltschik.[9]
Memoirs from the Soviet/Russian side are even more complete. First in importance is the 1216-page autobiography of Mikhail Gorbachev.[10] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze also published his recollections,[11] as have two of the Soviet Union's key "Germanists," Valentin Falin[12] and Yuly Kvitsinsky.[13] Two other memoirs also are worth considering: that of Gorbachev's adviser, billed as "Gorbachev's Kissinger," Anatoly Chernyayev,[14] and the insightful account of Soviet foreign and military policy coauthored by First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kornienko and former Chief of the General Staff (later Gorbachev's main military adviser) Sergei Akhromeev.[15]
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