This article will analyze the disjointed and ill-conceived plan to withdraw United States combat troops from Southeast Asia initiated in 1969. It will also assess how the removal of those troops directly affected the ability of the Armed Forces of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) to withstand Communist aggression. An examination of three pivotal military operations: the combined U.S.-ARVN incursion of Cambodia in March 1970, the invasion of Laos by ARVN troops in February 1971, and the 1972 Communist Easter Offensive, will illustrate negative effects on ARVN caused by this process of American de-escalation. The most critical of those being; inadequate training of ARVN, the lack of establishing a basic military criteria for the promotion of ARVN officers and non-commissioned officers, and never achieving full parity in ARVN morale with that of its enemy.
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