"It was a near-run thing," said the Duke of Wellington, after narrowly defeating Napoleon at Waterloo. The same could just as easily be said of Operation Linebacker II, what B-52 aircrews came to call the "11-Day War." If not for the bravery and resilience of those American airmen, the operation might have ended in disaster.
Linebacker I had been mounted in response to the earlier 1972 Easter Offensive, the North Vietnamese Army's sudden invasion of South Vietnam, a campaign that failed largely because of massive B-52 bombing. It had been hoped the war could then be concluded through diplomacy, but by mid-December it was clear the enemy was stalling at the negotiating table. Forty years ago this month, President Richard M. Nixon's patience ran out and he issued this order to the Joint Chiefs: "You are to commence at approximately 1200 Zulu, 18 December 1972, a three-day maximum effort, repeat maximum effort, of B-52/Tacair strikes in the Hanoi/Haiphong areas. Object is maximum destruction of selected targetsâ?¦.Be prepared to extend operations past three days, if directed."
The president's directive apparently came as a surprise to Strategic Air Command, which seemingly had no contingency plan compatible with Linebacker II's objectives. SAC was forced to fall back on its eight-year-old Operation Arc Light tactics (interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, coupled with close ground support). Tactical Arc Light operations, however, had little in common with the strategic bombing objectives of Linebacker II. Worse, after eight years of Arc Light operations in relatively benign threat environments, SAC HQ had become complacent about the dangers in Route Pack Six, the section of the combat theater encompassing Hanoi and Haiphong. This last circumstance led to a rude awakening when America's B-52 Stratofortress bombers proved shockingly vulnerable to the Soviet-built SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile (SAM) defense system.
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