The Japanese victory in Singapore was unprecedented in its scale and magnitude.? In fact, the victory was so total that Winston Churchill billed it as "the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history".1? Yet, Lieutenant-General Yamashita Tomoyuki, who orchestrated his victory, claimed in a post-war admission that his victory was a bluff that worked by the narrowest of margins.2? This notion flew in the face of his opponents, notably the British commander, Lieutenant-General A.E. Percival, who insisted that the Japanese won through sheer numerical superiority on the ground, in the air and on the seas.? Coupled to this view were excellent combat tactics employed by the Japanese with battle-hardened and experienced troops, which made victory a predictable result.2? How do we reconcile these two contrasting and contradictory assessments?? It is the intention of this paper to evaluate the basis of these two conflicting theses and highlight the inadequacies of each as a credible explanation for the Japanese victory in Singapore.? The paper will then argue that the Japanese victory was more that just a bluff that worked, but the result of bold generalship that invariably had to respond to the frictions of war and ultimately depended on calculated risk-taking that paid dividends.
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