Jules Roy described Dien Bien Phu as the "setting in which the West had suffered one of the greatest disasters in its history."[1] An assessment of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu reveals that the French had no clear objective, ignored conventional theories of warfare, over relied on air power, and underestimated the abilities of their adversary. An objective investigation of the events at Dien Bien Phu from November 1953 to May 1954 reveals that for as much as the French did wrong, the Vietminh did right.
When French Premier Rene Mayer selected General Henri Navarre to become the commander in chief of French forces in Indochina, he instructed him to create a military scenario in Indochina that would bring about a satisfactory political conclusion to hostilities there.[2] Navarre surveyed the situation in Indochina and concluded the greatest threat to achieving his given objective was in Tonkin; the Navarre Plan was the result. Navarre wanted to bring the "life and vigor" back to the French Expeditionary Corps while at the same time assuming an offensive posture to disrupt Vietminh forces and prevent their consolidation for a collective offensive.[3] For his center of operations in the north, Navarre chose Dien Bien Phu. Navarre designed Dien Bien Phu as a "mooring point" for French offensive operations to engage Vietminh units and "bar the road to Laos".[4] Logistics became the focus of Navarre's ambitions for Dien Bien Phu against the Vietminh. The French wanted to deny guerilla fighters necessary supplies, particularly rice. Also, Navarre believed a garrison stationed at Dien Bien Phu would disrupt the flow of supplies by Vietminh General Vo Nguyen Giap south through the neighboring country of Laos.[5] Opium production and trafficking, centered at Dien Bien Phu, provided the Vietminh with revenue to purchase weapons. Navarre planned to disrupt the opium trade to diminish the Vietminh's ability to sustain military action in the region.[6] By design, this strategy was constructed in order to draw the Vietminh out of hiding, forcing them to engage the French in a traditional confrontation.[7]
