I feel I should start this piece with a disclaimer. I am a historian, and hence I am fully aware that my colleagues are skeptical of what is known as "alternative history" or "what-if history". Perhaps they are correct. Political scientists have had an abysmally bad track record when they have tried to predict what will happen, so why should we take seriously the predictions of what would have happened? Indeed, we probably shouldn't. But I will try to make such reversed prophecies - in this piece, at least.
Actually, this piece is based on a long and informal talk I once had with Konstantin Asmolov, a prominent Russian historian of Korea. A few years ago we spent much time discussing assorted "what-if" possibilities of North Korean history, the "roads not taken".
Of all those possibilities, by far the most probable was a North Korean victory in autumn 1950. Indeed, it was a close call. The US decision to save the South from near-certain annihilation was made at the last moment and was, in essence, in contradiction to some earlier US plans and strategies.
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