“This is all wrong”, minuted Churchill on 7th January, 1941, after reading telegrams from the Commander -in-Chief, Far East, urging the reinforcement of Hong Kong. “If Japan goes to war there is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there. Instead of increasing the garrison it ought to be reduced. Japan will think twice before declaring war on the British Empire, and whether there are two or six battalions at Hong Kong will make no difference. I wish we had fewer troops there, but to move any would be noticeable and dangerous.”
How then did Churchill allow himself to be persuaded against his better judgement? The reasons are somewhat complex and due to political pressures, as much as anything else. It is easy to be critical in hindsight but then, as now, not many people were concerned about the adequacy of the defence of Hong Kong, after all Japan had been an ally during WWI and had only recently been recognised as a potential foe. The Admiralty wished at least to deny its facilities to the enemy and the chiefs of staff recommended that since Hong Kong could neither be relieved nor withstand a long siege it should be considered as an outpost, to be held as long as possible. So Churchill was forced to bow to political pressure and to the urgings of his advisors, the garrison would be increased. At the time of writing his minute there were actually four battalions stationed in Hong Kong, with the arrival of the Canadians, in November, this number was increased to six. These reinforcements were effectively good money thrown after bad, the outcome was never in doubt.
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