In the late summer of 55 BC Julius Caesar stood on the north coast of France and looked out over the Channel. Some 30 miles across the water lay an island, which, according to travellers' tales was rich in pearls, lead, gold, and tin, but Caesar's interest in Britain was dictated not so much by a desire to exploit her mineral wealth as by the strategic position of the island. He could clearly see that Britain posed a backdoor threat to his latest and greatest conquest (France) whose subjugation Caesar had now enforced after eight years' hard campaigning. During those years the Celts of Britain had aided their Gallic kinsmen against Caesar and he judged that until Britain was his, the north coast of France would always be vulnerable to surprise attack.
Caesar, however, was aware that there was little time left — before winter brought campaigning to a halt — to complete a British invasion, not time enough, in fact, to mount the usual Roman form of attack that called for long-term tactics, infiltrating enemy territory and sapping morale through propaganda and subversion. There was no time either for proper reconnaissance of the island, of for gathering information about the nature and size of the country, its harbours and the methods of fighting used by its inhabitants.
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