World War I in general and the so-called First Battle of the Marne in particular are still relevant to military operations
today. There are many lessons that the modern military professional can draw from the first six weeks of the war, which was fought mainly between German forces and those of the allied French and British. Among the most important of these is that even if an army espouses mission command in its culture and doctrine, it can execute it poorly or in a manner that could make the methodology not only ineffective, but also counterproductive.
The first Marne campaign was unique and paradoxical since it was a strategic loss for Germany in a situation where German forces won almost every tactical engagement. Analyzing how this happened offers key insights that are relevant to our armed forces today, particularly as they may apply to analysis and employment of the mission command concept.
Background of the Campaign
The designation “First Battle of the Marne” is in fact a misnomer; there was no decisive battle. It was
rather a series of numerous skirmishes and several separate battles fought between Imperial German
Army and Anglo-French forces along the Ourcq, Petit Morin, Grand Morin, and Aisne Rivers in northwestern France (see figure 1).
