Haig Was Politically Astute, But Militarily Lacking

C.S. Forrester’s fictional description of flawed British generalship in the First World War epitomizes the widespread sentiment that the British Army had been lions led by donkeys to their needless slaughter. To many, Sir Douglas Haig, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force from 1915 to 1918, represents the chief butcher and bungler. After Haig’s death in 1928, his rivals—chiefly the former Prime Minister Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, a future Prime Minister, and military theorist B.H. Liddell-Hart—shaped and advanced this narrative.[2] However, in the 1960s, several British historians began to push back against these views.[3] Some even went so far as to claim that Haig represented a “clear-eyed architect of victory.”[4] J.P. Harris’ Douglas Haig and the First World War represents an antidote to both of these narrative extremes. Harris, a historian and senior lecturer at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, carefully avoids these caricatures. Instead, Harris levels well-researched critiques of Haig’s operational and strategic leadership while simultaneously addressing inaccuracies in the prevailing historical narratives around Haig’s influence on the tactical adaptation of the British Expeditionary Force and his relationship with emerging technology.