Scholars have long agreed that John Marshall occupies a preeminent place in the growth of American constitutionalism. Marshall contributed significantly to constitutional law and cemented the institutional role of the Supreme Court as a coequal branch of government. Yet, despite numerous studies (see, for instance, Herbert A. Johnson, The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 1801–1835. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1997, and G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–35. New York: Macmillan, 1988), Marshall has remained a surprisingly elusive subject for historians. The classic study by Albert J. Beveridge (The Life of John Marshall, 4 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916–19) is marred by both inaccuracies and undue partisanship. To complicate matters, Marshall’s constitutional philosophy has too often been viewed in a simplistic manner designed to validate twentieth-century notions of judicial review and enlarged governmental authority.