It’s July, and war has returned to Europe. Tensions have been high for months after two major powers, engaged in a contest for influence, intervened in a local political crisis. Multiple brokered agreements, breathlessly described in the international press, have collapsed, but at long last the parties appear to be nearing a peaceful resolution. Then the text of a diplomatic telegram, carefully and covertly edited to provoke outrage, leaks publicly. Mass demonstrations erupt as nationalist commentators demand retribution. With protestors gathered outside government offices, the president declares war.
The scenario described is neither the pretext for a futuristic wargame nor the plot of the next political thriller in your Netflix queue. It’s the story of how France and Prussia went to war in 1870 after a brief but intense period of competition, unraveling the concert of Europe, which had maintained a fragile peace among the great powers for over 50 years.
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Over the last several years, great-power competition has become a major topic of discussion, prompting policymakers, scholars, and pundits alike to look to the past for lessons to explain the emerging contest between the United States and China. Most have turned to the Cold War, the most recent (and for an older generation of analysts, personally familiar) example of great-power rivalry. But while this history can be instructive, an over-reliance on a single analogy carries its own risks. Just as an examination of the past can deepen our understanding of human and state behavior, too narrow a focus on a dominant metaphor can circumscribe our thinking and trap decision-makers in dangerous patterns.
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