Ben Ho Wan Beng’s excellent recap in The Diplomat of 1944’s Battle of Philippine Sea holds some interesting lessons for how we think about military power and how learning affects the prospects of victory in battle. Ben ably works through the tactical details and dilemmas of the battle, leaving space for working through some of the broader strategic and institutional lessons. In this context, what’s really interesting about the Battle of Philippine Sea is how key factors in the balance between U.S. and Japanese forces changed between 1942 and 1944.
The decisive weapons of both the Battle of Midway (June 1942) and the Battle of Philippine Sea (June 1944) were aircraft carriers and their warplanes. Surface ships and submarines played important, but supporting, roles in both battles. In 1942, the Imperial Japanese Navy had major advantages in aircraft and pilot training, the fruit of a meticulously designed system for connecting the best human capital with the best technology Japanese industry had to offer. These advantages made it exceedingly dangerous to tangle with Japanese naval aviators. Still, American forces could more than hold their own under many circumstances; Japanese advantages were not so overwhelming that they precluded other decisive factors in battle.
