ajor General Stephen Van Rensselaer was given a mission: He was to lead an American invasion force against the British at the Pillage of Queenston, Ont., across from Lewiston, in the month of October 1812.
Major General Henry Dearborn ordered him to raise 1,000 militia from New York. He had all the odds in his favor: He would outnumber the British with a force of 6,000 regular army troops and militia. The British would defend with a mere force of regular army troops, Canadian Militia and Indians from the Iroquois Nation, totaling 2,000. How could he lose? All the major general had to do was cross the Niagara River, gain the village of Queenston, and secure the Heights. And here is the tragedy of such arrogance.
The Village of Queenston, Ont., formed the epicenter of the portage route from Lake Ontario, through Fort George, Chippawa and Fort Erie. Whatever supplies, civilian or military personnel, or war material passed along this route, passed through this sleepy Canadian town. The military planners of the day decided that whoever controlled Queenston and the adjoining Heights commanded the portage route between the Great Lakes and the British forts. The Americans could strike boldly, secure the Heights, divide the British forces, and deliver a hammer and anvil strike, catching the British between Montreal and the western edge of Lake Ontario. Van Rensselaer could divide Upper Canada and threaten Lower Canada with an aggressive American fighting force. Or so it seemed.
