The Battle of Cambrai in November 1917 turned out, for both Britain and Germany, to be a major signpost showing how to break the trench deadlock of the previous three years. The lessons of the operational successes and failures would be digested by both sides over the forthcoming winter. For the British, especially, the battle failed to live up to the initial expectations but lessons were learned by both sides. Although the Germans would apply what they had learned first, it was to be the British who were to be the more successful at putting the new developments into practice.
The Battle of Cambrai - general area (Map image courtesy Probert Encyclopedia)
Cambrai was to give the British GHQ food for thought over the winter. Clearly they had to understand what had gone right but, perhaps, more importantly, what had gone wrong. The reasons for the failure to achieve everything that was hoped for may have started at the planning stage.
The plan for the battle came about as a result of an idea initially put forward by Lt-Col JFC Fuller, GSO1 of the Tank Corps. He initially devised an Anglo-French attack supported by tanks, to capture St Quentin. This evolved into the operation at Cambrai.
