Kasserine Pass: Defeat is a Matter of Scale, by MAJ Eric Evans, 45 pages.
The Battle of Kasserine Pass is marked by history as an embarrassing defeat of American soldiers
during their first major action against Germany in World War II; some historians even go so far
as to anticipate defeat in the first battles of all major American wars. Does the battle of Kasserine
Pass prove the conventional wisdom that America is doomed to defeat in its first battles? Martin
Blumenson, a prominent military historian, characterizes the battle of Kasserine Pass as a
crushing defeat. He cites inexperience, inferior technology, and poor doctrine as causation. This
monograph challenges Blumenson’s thesis. Scientific study of the battle of Kasserine Pass,
inspired by Hans Delbruck, focuses on relevant technologies, the organization of opposing units,
US doctrine, and the effects of the ULTRA program. Conclusions from the scientific analysis
carry forward to a comparison of contemporary battles.
There are many similarities between the battle of Kasserine Pass and other battles, such as the
Battle of the Bulge, which history characterizes as victories. To determine why, an in-depth study
of the battle of Kasserine Pass is necessary to identify errors in the current history. This study
uses Clausewitz’s method of critical analysis and the application of historical scale to compare
the battles of Kasserine Pass and St. Vith. When viewed at a similar scale, the results of Kasserine
Pass are similar to the results from the actions around St. Vith during the Battle of the Bulge.
Surprise, rapid penetration and isolation of friendly units, breakdowns in command, the eventual
surrender of terrain, and successful Allied counter attacks characterize both battles. The
similarities in outcome require similar classification
