Is Army Ignoring History in Ukraine Prep?

Among the many problems Putin’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine presents the U.S. Army is a highly dynamic and complex situation leaders must continually reassess. According to Army doctrine the first step of solving any problem is to “understand those conditions that represent the current situation.” Toward this end, officers at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College cluster around white boards to discuss NATO’s options, how Ukraine is performing so well, and why Russia is performing so poorly. Their conversations are invariably characterized by a heavy emphasis on the current state of the crisis and account for all the operational, mission, and civil variables at play, an approach well founded in U.S. Army and Joint doctrine. Unfortunately, these perspectives reflect a persistent problem within the Army – a culture of ahistoricism. Few, if any, of these conversations include a historical perspective on variables such as NATO’s eastward expansion, Putin’s past and how it shapes his worldview, or Russia’s complex relationship with Ukraine. This is perplexing given Putin’s use of revisionist history to justify his invasion. Perhaps Army officers believe history insufficiently prepares them to solve modern problems. Nonetheless, if the Army wants to prepare officers to understand and win in complex environments like Ukraine it must first reverse an ahistoric culture and restore officers’ historical mindedness.