The Bay of Pigs invasion was President John F. Kennedy’s most controversial foreign policy mistake, and it serves as a useful case study in strategic miscalculation and faulty critical analysis. The failures in the planning and conduct of the operation highlight the leadership challenges and inherent difficulty in attempting to covertly overthrow another government deemed hostile to National Security interests. Planned initially during President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration and executed by President Kennedy’s administration, the Bay of Pigs was devised as an attempt to foment a popular uprising against the government of the newly triumphant Cuban dictator, Fidel Castro.
Operation Zapata was a covert effort led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to organize and train expatriate Cubans as a direct action force to invade Cuba and establish a base of operations that would incite a general revolt against Castro.[1] The CIA had been responsible for the successful, covert coups d’état in Iran under Operation Ajax in 1953, and in Guatemala under Operation Success in 1954, proving a U.S. aptitude for this type of operation.[2] To maintain plausible deniability, President
Kennedy wanted it to be executed under the auspices of rich Cuban dissidents who were willing to pay for the cost of the invasion themselves.[3] In the end, the operation was overly complex, based on multiple unsubstantiated assumptions, and underwent too many last minute changes, which ultimately rendered it impossible for the operation to comply with an absolute requirement that the U.S. maintain plausible deniability of its participation.
