General Vandergrift could not have been more succinct to the U.S. Senate on May 6, 1946, when giving his now famous Bended Knee speech. He must have dutifully recalled the very horrors, difficulties, and triumphs that became Operation Watchtower at Guadalcanal. This essay will seek to lay the argument that in the next war in the Pacific, the ability of the Marine Corps alongside the US Navy, to control critical sea lanes via small craft will be critical to victory much like the Patrol Boat was to the many amphibious operations in World War II.
As the ground forces commander on Guadalcanal, MajGen Vandergrift held sway as the landing force commander. His challenges were many, to include enemy composition, support from Naval Forces, and logistics. These issues paled in comparison to the overall demonstrative task to quickly land amphibious forces and reconstitute upon completion of the battle in order to move to the next objective. The Patrol Boat solved many of these critical problems of securing key sea lanes and keeping Imperial Japanese cruisers and destroyers off balance in order enable the amphibious landings at Guadalcanal.
The criticality of the Patrol Boat was violently apparent in the days after the successful Guadalcanal landings, when the Japanese were able to sink, damage, and scatter the critically important Naval Vessels supporting the Marine amphibious forces ashore. It was the remaining Patrol Boats that harassed Japanese forces buying critical time and decision space that enabled the landing force Commander, MajGen Vandergrift the opportunity to successfully execute operations ashore. In the next war in the Pacific, we will have a need for a similar platform, able to move small platoon sized elements rapidly through the narrow waterways and shallow waters of Malaysia, Philippines, and the islands of the South Pacific.
