By the end of World War II, the United States had sent the world’s most powerful navy to war at sea. The exigencies of war pushed the U.S. Navy into overdrive to man, train, and equip naval forces. The hard-learned lessons of waging war across two hemispheres had impelled the Navy to develop and rapidly adopt new and hugely effective tactics, techniques, and procedures. By war’s end, the U.S. Navy had no peer in underway replenishment, forward base building and sustainment, amphibious operations, surface warfare, and carrier-based air power.
With the end of the war in 1945, however, public sentiment, a parsimonious Congress, and the Truman Administration’s hard ceiling on military spending forced the Navy to adopt a plan that resulted in a rapid and unprecedented demobilization. Nearly three million highly experienced sailors and Marines were discharged within months, new ship and new aircraft development and construction were canceled, and some 1,800 ships were scheduled for mothballing in the coming year. James D. Hornfischer’s new book, Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War, 1945-1960 is the story of how a once-powerful Navy was lost and rebuilt anew. It’s also a cautionary tale for today’s decision-makers that underscores the foresight of the Founding Fathers who issued a constitutional mandate to “maintain a Navy,” and of ancient Greek strategist Themistocles’ keen insight that “whosoever can hold the sea has command of everything.”
