Although the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 dramatically proved the importance of the U-2 and aerial reconnaissance, the scenario was not the least pleasant for the US pilots involved in recce missions. As explained by Krzysztof Dabrowski in his book Hunt for the U-2, the primary issue was the presence of the Soviet S-75 SAM-sites: their deployment had been detected by a U-2 mission on Aug. 29. The Americans also had little problem in finding out that by Oct. 26, 1962 the personnel of the 11th Missile Air Defence Division had constructed and deployed 24 SAM-sites.
However, not one of all these was ever activated. Indeed, multiple missions Boeing RB-47Hs of the 55 Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, not to mention the US Navy `technical research ship’ USS Oxford (AGTR- 1) – a vessel well-equipped for ELINT and SIGINT gathering – could not even collect enough intelligence to confirm that they had been integrated into an air defence system. In other words: Soviet S-75s were in Cuba, but ‘zip lip.’ Despite all the overflights by reconnaissance aircraft, they never powered up their radar let alone opened fire.
The Americans were not the only ones wondering about this behaviour. Late in the evening of Oct. 26, Fidel Castro visited the Soviet HQ at El Chico: considering the situation and near-constant violations of Cuban airspace by US aircraft and the threat of an invasion, he demanded that the Soviets activate their air defences: to open fire – in the same fashion as he had already issued an order for the air defences of the Cuban armed forces to open fire – at the intruders. Having no such orders from Moscow, the Soviet proved reluctant. Nevertheless, they were eventually to bow to Castro’s demands. Early on the morning of Oct. 27, their SAM-sites powered up their radars, de-facto establishing, a `no-go’ zone over Cuba for high-flying US aircraft. The RB-47Hs and USS Oxford took a few hours to detect and confirm this important development, and then to report it to Washington.
