Why The United States Failed During The Early Cold War

A growing number of scholars and policymakers are showing interest in a grand strategy that calls on the United States to retrench from key global regions while devolving the burden of checking the expansion of hegemonic aspirants to local allies. I highlight the military vulnerability of allies as an underappreciated variable that can compromise the leading power’s efforts to phase out of an “onshore” military role. The regional great-power adversary is unlikely to sit idly by while a weaker neighbor converts its material resources into new military capabilities with the faraway leading power’s sponsorship. Instead, it will be tempted to forcefully nip the neighbor’s militarization in the bud. Insofar as allies are sensitive to the risks of incurring costly preventive aggression, they have incentives to undermine the leading power’s efforts to build up their combined military strength as a substitute for the forces it currently has stationed in the region. Using a wide range of primary and secondary sources, I trace the process by which American plans to retrench from Europe were frustrated in the first decade of the Cold War, finding powerful support for my argument. This analysis suggests lessons for the debate on whether the United States could pursue an orderly military withdrawal from Europe and East Asia. Read Full Article »