How America Triumphed Over Japan
Pacific Victory
The war in the Pacific was won because of superior resources, number of ships, plans, etc., but strategically, the chief factor was the ability of the U.S. Navy to free itself of bases of supply, carrying its own mobile bases as part of U.S. Task Forces, something which the Japanese never foresaw. Since Tokyo’s forces were spread thin among island chains, it could not see or fortify points of attack. It reminds one of Sherman’s army holding a crossroad and forcing the Confederate forces to split its forces uncertain of which point to defend.
In addition, the U.S. did not have to worry about moving supplies against Japan because the U.S. Navy had ships that were floating dry docks and supply ships that went wherever the war ships went. The U.S. Navy was not dependent on ports. It could go to the Central Pacific at Tarawa or the South Pacific like Guadalcanal or the North Pacific like Saipan because it could always supply its forces.
And just as the British blockade of Germany was the chief agent acting to bring Germany to its knees in World War I, so it was the U.S. submarine blockade of Japan that was the most potent weapon in its defeat, at least before the use of the atomic bombs that closed the war there. The U.S. sank 60 percent of ships bringing oil, rubber into Japan, but what is shocking is to view how inconsistently, fitfully and erratically this strategic weapon was employed by the Navy leaders. (The greatest number of sub attacks on shipping didn’t occur until 1944.)
America’s Might
Another key U.S. accomplishment was America's ability to militarize its mass production economy, including using companies like the Ford Motor company which built tanks by prefabricated parts and which used subcontractors to mass-produce heavy bombers in just the way it had done cars. This included Henry Kaiser's genius in discovering a new way to make ships in prefabricated sections, abandoning the old method of building from the keel up. (Americans have a genius for this - think of the Aballoon houses of the 1830s in Chicago. The British observed the structures would have blown away except that every section was fastened with a screw so that any strain would go against the grain of the wood.)
Russian aid. The sheer wealth of the U.S. economy was able to pour money like water from a sluice into Russia, which kept its armies afloat. This meant that America had the ability to motorize, not only its own army, but the Red Army, which was bearing the main burden of the fighting and slaughter against the Nazis. The progress made by the Russians in warfare demands notice – (I am thinking especially of their brilliant defense in depth at Kursk) which forced the Germans to expend their best energy and equipment on attacks that left them vulnerable to counterattack. This was due to the stubborn brilliance of Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who made his views prevail over Stalin's, but it should also be remembered that Zhukov was a butcher - his victories cost many more of his own men than the enemies.
One should also note the T-34 Soviet tank, which outfought the German Panzers. The T-34 was designed by an American, but America turned up its nose at it.
Technology and Innovation
Technological innovation provided other absolutely essential reasons for Allied victory. For example, it is astounding to consider that the U.S. and Britain were losing the air war to the Germans until someone came up with the idea of using disposable fuel tanks on fighter escorts. This simple device enabled the Allies to destroy the German Air Force and rendered the bombing offensive victorious and secured the victory of D-Day. Germany clearly was doomed. But America’s policy about Germany was cold-blooded – outfits in the Eighth Air Force acted as bait, the big formations were used to lure German fighters up at which point the P-51s shot them down. But the U.S. did lose 26,000 young men in the Eighth.
We also have to remember the horrendous mass-casualty murders and economic and social damage that was inflicted on the German people by the bombing campaign. My uncle Jim, who served with the Eighth Air Force that bombed both Cologne and Hamburg and who received the Distinguished Flying Cross, used to say to me that he was probably a war criminal for those bombings
Other Factors
The winning of the Battle of the Atlantic was key, along with Hitler's blunder in not being able to win the war in the Mediterranean. That is a whole another topic. For example, when Manstein was collecting forces for the attack on Kursk, Hitler had already diverted key forces into Italy.
Another important point: the failure of the Germans to develop any strategic bombing capability proved catastrophic. Theirs was an air force designed primarily for ground support. The designer of German four-engine heavy bombers died in 1934, and no one took his place. There were no B-17s or B-24s or B- 29s in the Luftwaffe.
I have noticed comments on the speed of war and Roosevelt’s “Germany first” strategy. It pays to go back to the writings of the great British strategic geographer Halford Mackinder, who believed that a country’s power flowed from its place on a map. (Think of Napoleon’s “A country’s geography is its fate.”)
In the past some powers had exercised power out of all proportion to others because their sea power enabled them to send forces – arms, men and wealth - to crisis areas in the “world island” – Europe, Asia, Africa. In the 20th century, railroads, motor cars and aircraft had made sea power obsolete in terms of effective speed. Thus a continental power could use such means to outflank a sea power. It was Alfred Wedemeyer, a graduate of the German Staff College, who convinced FDR and Marshall, that the way to counter Hitler was to create a vast American armored force. It was this conviction that lay at the basis of Roosevelt’s “Germany First” war plan.