The Forgotten Legacy of the Fourth French Republic
By most accounts, the Fourth French Republic ultimately proved a political failure. Its lumbering bureaucratic complexities and perceived ineptitude eventually earned the ire of both its citizens and politicians. Its collapse in 1958 signaled a reset for France; a coming of age for a nation still living in the shadow of its greatest failure. Yet, as an interim government explicitly designed to rescue France from complete collapse following occupation, its legacy is deserving of far more respect than its typically given.
When compared to the tumultuous decade which preceded it, the immediate postwar years which followed the defeat of Nazi Germany are easy to overlook. However, the months which followed the Allies victory in Europe defined the geopolitical fates of several nations for nearly half a century. This is especially true for the formerly occupied territories in central and eastern Europe. Some, like Germany itself, became a victim of the east-west political rivalry that followed the war. In Greece, a bloody civil war between the nationalist and communist coalitions would ravage the barely recovered countryside until 1949. Others like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia became client states, denied the right to form their own destiny for decades.
It was in this volatile political climate, the hurriedly assembled Fourth French Republic was able to stabilize the country, and begin the process of economic, social, and cultural rehabilitation. When considered in the context of how so many states failed that transition, it’s hard to characterize this accomplishment as anything other than remarkable. However, true appreciation of the important role which the Fourth Republic played in France’s recovery starts with understanding the country it inherited after the war.
Origins of Defeat
It is a common misconception that the French military collapse that followed the German invasion of 1940 was the result of poor preparation and weak command infrastructure. This was simply not the case. The commonly referenced myth was largely the brainchild of Marshall Pétain’s Vichy Government, who’s propaganda department was determined to create a suitable excuse for the humiliating defeat at the hands of the Nazi war machine. “The French army had the equipment and personnel – five million men, more than they had in 1914 – to really take the Germans on”, Michaël Bourlet, historian and former professor at the Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan military academy, said in a 2020 interview. The defeat of the French military, in reality, proved more reflective of the overwhelming prowess of the German Army and the political incompetence in Paris, rather than any insufficient efforts of resistance on the part of the French people.
Once it became clear that defeat was inevitable, Prime Minister Paul Reynaud resigned, handing over the dubious task of capitulation to the elderly war hero Marshall Philippe Pétain. The armistice that Pétain signed allowed for the creation of an unoccupied French zone in the south, a provision that the French government secured with the intent of saving at least some national pride and starting anew. This new government in the south, theoretically free of German dictatorial rule, was arguably the first attempt at remaking France in the aftermath of its defeat. And it was a colossal failure.
Pétain’s “Vichy” government soon proved to be nothing less than a Nazi-lite state, with a foreign policy denominated by Minister Pierre Laval, who vigorously blamed the fall of France on Communists, Socialists, and Jews. Ironically, while the old war hero depicted this new government as a refuge for all true French patriots, Pétain’s regime proved to be a far-right, culturally obsessed reactionary state with little connection to the France of the past. The Vichy government began regularly purging communists and racial minorities, deporting them in an effort rivaled only by the Nazis themselves. In Pétain’s view, the Third Republic had fallen due to the erosive nature of liberal initiatives such as universal public education and social tolerance. His plea for “an intellectual and moral revival” became a rallying cry for Nazi sympathizers across France, including the nation’s Catholic establishment. Notable French Catholic leaders like Cardinal Suhard enthusiastically supported the armistice, calling on the French public to accept the occupation and, “remain calm, work, and pray”. Cardinal Claudel, a well-known far-right activist and traditionalist, even welcomed the collapse of the French Third Republic, calling it a, “obnoxious parliamentary regime”.
While the sacrifice and perseverance of the French Resistance during the war served as a source of pride for many Frenchmen, the reality was this combination of German occupation in the north, and collaboration and far-right governance in the south, severely damaged national faith in French institutions, ideals, and politics. Therefore, it’s important to note that not only did the fourth republic face the dizzying task of rebuilding France physically, but spiritually as well. This problem of both political and mental degradation during the occupation years was not unique to France. However, what was unique is that the initial postwar government was able to weather these challenges without the nation collapsing in chaos or succumbing to a civil war.
Resistance and Renewal
Despite Pétain’s efforts to legitimize the Vichy government, it was during these occupation years that remnants of the French military in Africa, along with those who had survived the German invasion, united behind French general and unabashed nationalist Charles De Gaulle. Born in 1890, De Gaulle grew up in Paris, where his father served as a teacher. De Gaulle had gained recognition from his fellow Frenchmen for the first time during the initial stages of the German invasion in 1940. Elevated to a position of authority over the French Fifth Army’s tank division, De Gaulle led the Saar Offensive, a counterattack from the French army that briefly penetrated German territory, marking one of the few successful French maneuvers of the war. Once Pétain had signed the armistice with Hitler ending the conflict, De Gaulle was forced to flee to London, as he had fallen out of favor with the French government for refusing to honor the treaty.
In exile, De Gaulle created the Free French Forces, and organized what was left of the French colonial empire that had not sided with the Vichy regime. His efforts proved incredibly successful, with his radio addresses reaching millions of French around the globe. From there, Free French Forces overthrew Vichy loyalists in Lebanon, Algeria, Syria, and other regional colonies. It was during these years that the rationale and moral foundation of the future republic was formed. Unlike Pétain, De Gaulle exonerated French society of any blame for the government’s collapse, embracing the traditions and history of the Third Republic. De Gaulle’s vision of France expressed through his broadcasted speeches was one where free speech flourished and liberty was the cornerstone of the French government. By the time De Gaulle and Free French Forces marched through a liberated Paris near the war’s end, his future as the paramount figure in French politics was all but secured.
However, despite De Gaulle’s significance in creating the environment and support needed for the fourth republic, he only briefly served as its leader on two separate occasions. From 1944 to 1946, De Gaulle was President of the Provincial government, and again from 1958 to 1969, he served as Prime Minister. The elections of 1946 saw the rise of a coalition between the Christian Democrats and Socialists, culminating under the leadership of Georges Bidault, who finally presented a constitution for approval to the French people. The results of the national referendum were sufficient to inaugurate the fourth republic, with 53% of voters approving of the document. The bicameral legislative body created fell under the leadership of a Prime Minister and his cabinet, with the President of the Republic serving a mostly symbolic role.
Road to Recovery
Although France was faced with profound spiritual and psychological damage following the war, its economic crisis was arguably of far greater significance. By the end of the war, two million French homes had been damaged with half a million beyond repair. The prime method of transportation, the national railway system, was completely neutralized. Three thousand bridges and 90% of French automobiles were destroyed or damaged, in addition to a severe shortage of gasoline and oil. The majority of French ports were sabotaged by retreating Germans, and landmines were present in the vast majority of French farmland. Finally, communication beyond handheld radio or mail was nonexistent, with virtually the nation’s entire telegraph and phone line system compromised. These circumstances which the fourth republic faced were not only overcomb, but eclipsed. By 1957, not only had the nation’s industrial production recovered from the war, but actually doubled from its pre-war status.
The new national government undertook an aggressive campaign to revitalize the economy through direct investment, with the key industries of public utilities, coal mines, the airline industry, and the financial system being nationalized. Integration within greater Europe as a means of economic recovery was also adopted, leading to France becoming a member of the European Economic Community, later known as the Common Market in the EU. France also proposed the European Coal and Steel Community Pact, which removed economic tariffs on raw materials with West Germany. This emphasis on economic development and productivity also had a positive impact on the individual, with the average worker’s salary increasing 170% between 1950-1974, with private consumption increasing 174% in that same period.
Despite this impressive resume of economic and social recovery under both De Gaulle and other significant leaders of the fourth republic, the new system ultimately failed because of its inability to execute the transition from a colonial to a post-colonial power. The end of French control in Indochina weakened the national government, however, it was the 1958 attempted coup that proved fatal for the Republic. With national confidence in the system finally slipping, De Gaulle emerged from political retirement to lead the government once again, promising to abolish the politically weak government and replace it with a new constitution. In a twist of irony, it was De Gaulle who sealed the fate of the Republican system he so fervently campaigned for during the war.
Conclusion
Historical criticism of the fourth republic typically touches on its inability to preserve the pre-war status of France. As its colonial empire began to disintegrate after the war, the republic became entangled in a series of frenzied asymmetrical conflicts which ultimately exhausted it. These included suppressing guerilla uprisings in Vietnam and Algeria, as well as a brutal repression of Malagasy rebels in 1947-1949. The fourth republic also supported Israel and the United Kingdom during the ill-fated military expedition that would become known as the Suez Crisis in 1956. Additionally, critics have pointed to the republic’s rampant political chaos, a far more legitimate assessment considering its eventual collapse.
To judge the fourth republic primarily on its failure to preserve an already crippled empire, or its institutional tumult, suggests an unreasonable standard. The era of decolonization was the result of the general decline of European powers, further fueled by ideas like nationalism and self-determinism which had dominated the 20th century. To lay the blame of a generational, global movement for freedom at the feet of French territorial mismanagement is inaccurate. Criticisms of the republic's political instability, while more valid, similarly lack needed context. There’s no doubt that its disarray impeded its efficiency, but considering the circumstances in which the institution operated, this specific critique lacks much-needed context. When compared to the dozens of interim governments after the war that failed entirely, one could argue that the government’s limited accomplishments are all the more impressive.
As a political institution, the fourth republic was a clear failure. However, as a vehicle for postwar recovery, as a means by which the people of France regained some semblance of pride in themselves and their country, the fourth republic was an unappreciated success. The republic’s laser-focused agenda of economic recovery was successful in jumpstarting France’s return to global preeminence. While Germany was being partitioned and Greece was being ravaged by political disfiguration and political conflict, two common fates that the majority of European states faced after the war, France was rebuilding itself piece by piece without succumbing to either fate. Modern France owes its remarkable recovery after World War 2 to the quick and decisive action taken by the fourth republic and its leaders.
The true purpose of any democratic government is to serve the interests of its people. If we remain faithful to that measurement of success, the fourth republic accomplished much. It restored a tattered French economy, culture, and national spirit. Could others have done better? Arguably, yes. But that should not prevent us from recognizing the valuable role that the fourth republic played in the annals of French history.
