Churchill Demonstrated That Prudent Political Control Over Military Policy Can Be Both Effective and Appropriate
Military and foreign policy professionals frequently argue against the "politicization of the military." But the phrase is cliché, and the argument is wrongheaded. Politicians must assert themselves in military affairs for at least three reasons: to safeguard the morality of war, to prevent distrust among military organizations in the areas of strategy and decision-making, and to hold generals and admirals accountable for deficient performance.
Politicians are not just decision-makers but also moral agents. Their choices carry profound ethical implications for military operations. Political leaders strive to craft and implement policies that serve the greater good, even if it means accepting some level of suffering. Implementing policy can involve taking moral responsibility for decisions that military leaders directly oversee, a critical responsibility.
Winston Churchill provides an excellent case study of political decisions and policies encompassing military operations. While debating the tactical use of airpower before Operation Overlord, he insisted that civilian casualties account for less than 10,000 people. When Air Marshall Tedder forecasted an estimated 160,000 casualties because of the operation, Churchill remarked, "You are piling up an awful load of hatred." His statement reflected his duty to balance postwar diplomacy with present military efficiency within a Western context of ethics.
Churchill's decisions often involved a delicate balance between military efficiency and civilian safety. When considering whether to use metal chaff to disrupt German radar, he had to weigh the increased efficiency and safety of British bombing formations against the risk to British civilians and air defense should the Germans copy and implement the same tactic. These policy questions involved direct risk to British infrastructure and civilians, highlighting the complexity and responsibility of political decision-making in military affairs.
In Western democracies, political representatives are acutely aware of their actions' moral weight. This understanding is reciprocated by military leaders, who trust in the decisions of political leaders to shape military strategy and achieve desired ends. This trust forms the bedrock of the military profession, strengthening the relationship between the two entities.
Trust is foundational to the military. Trust is also bidirectional. A dynamic culture of trust, given and received, establishes confidence from shared adversity and the belief that a peer, superior, or subordinate has the individual's and organization's best interest at heart. Once there is trust in the organization, militaries want to think that the political decision to go to war is moral. Because of the inherent morality assumed in the decision to go to war, western militaries subvert their organizations to the policy of political leaders even when counterintuitive to their perceptions. Military leaders act in this manner since they recognize the military is one of and not the only instrument of national power. For this reason, military requirements are subservient to the decisions made by civilian leaders, who exercise the numerous levers of power.
Churchill again provides an illuminating illustration in his decision to withhold some intelligence provided by the Ultra program to prevent the Germans from realizing the vulnerability of their codes. Allied convoys suffered attacks from German submarines due to this policy decision. Churchill claimed moral responsibility for this decision because he could not expect his tactical commanders to remain inactive if they received this intelligence. If Churchill had pushed this decision down the chain of command, he would have created a climate of mistrust in all subsequent decisions coming through military authorities.
For this reason, public political statements by civilian leaders require analysis deeper than prima facie examination. Even experienced analysts and generals have difficulty parsing a political ploy from a military plan. For example, in his article, Churchill and his Generals, Eliot Cohen fails to judge Churchill's statements for more than face value. He supports this analysis with negative observations made by Churchill's general officers, who also misread Churchill. Cohen misinterprets his information in his largely apologetic argument for Churchill's worth as a wartime leader. Cohen states of Churchill, "Many of his schemes and persistent clamor for operations against northern Norway did not meet the test of military practicality." Many of Churchill's generals' memoirs carried the same accusations.
The generals and Cohen's analysis miscarries for two reasons. First, the British military conducted deception operations that involved convincing Germany that the Allies would undertake the invasion of Norway. The London Controlling Section, formed in 1941 to conduct strategic deception operations, specifically used Norway as an objective to misdirect German planners. Second, the London Controlling Section initially relied on actual war plans but transitioned to radio traffic and overt means for which false information traveled to the world. Whereas Cohen attributes Churchill's "clamoring" for Northern Norway as a failed policy, his public statements were likely a ploy linked to four named deception operations between 1942 and 1944 aimed at keeping significant Axis forces tied to Norway. However, Churchill owned these decisions and elevated them from military leaders. Thrusting these public deception operations to his operational commanders would have sowed division and mistrust in the British military.
Churchill's General's may have judged him harshly. However, he and his contemporaries judged and relieved generals based on performance in a way not seen in the 21st century. Many sources have compared the attrition rates of general officers relieved of command in past wars during the 19th and 20th centuries and how there is not even a remote association to the practice in the 21st century today. Because senior generals in the service have not developed the metrics for a more performance-based system to assess generals, there is no objective way to rate superior performance in training. But politicians must hold generals accountable, much like they drove the Secret Service director Kimberley Cheatle to resign amidst an acrimonious bi-partisan cross-examination of her actions and inactions. Generals write memoirs to preserve their legacies. Put their legacies at risk in the manner of a public stoning.
Furthermore, politicians should also attack the raters (senior officers) of general officers who place them in these positions. If multiple legacies are at risk, flag officers will develop and implement metrics other than relying on incestuous subjectivity to bestow/recommend general officer positions. More importantly, accountability hearings like Benghazi, the Afghanistan withdrawal, and others will not see senior officers falling back on the adage of "I was told" or "I was waiting on guidance."
Politicians and civilian leaders interacting at the policy level usually deal with general officers and their staff when directing military use. Notably, the turbulence surrounding the Afghanistan withdrawal indicates that military decisions made by political leaders led to force protection failure and other chaos on the ground. Perhaps political leaders were micromanaging despite the general officers' best judgment, or the generals did not push back and provide sound strategy. While the argument for a complete divorce from politicians micromanaging military units appears appropriate, this article makes the case that politicians must extend their influence through military operations in specific environments.
At face value, the suggestion that policy should remain isolated from certain military operational levels fails because morality anchors Western conduct of military operations. National policymakers directly influence military echelons through strategic appraisal and applying Western moral ethics. Achieving the appropriate moral equilibrium inspires political leaders to extend policy toward proper levels of operations. It also maintains trust among the military because politicians can make policy decisions that would ruin a soldier's trust in a commander. Public confidence in commanders requires rigorous interrogation of their actions by political leaders. If political leaders maintain evenness in determining the appropriate input to military decisions and actions while holding generals accountable, it will ensure that the manner of fighting war makes pursuing peace less tempestuous.
