Plausible Deniability and the Bay of Pigs Tragedy
On the 65th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs tragedy, we must remember what occurred to avoid an incident like it ever happening again.
From April through October 1961, hundreds of executions took place in those fortress-prisons, and prisoners complained they could not sleep because of the shots heard day and night. Antonino Díaz Pou, a leader of one of the infiltration teams sent in advance of the invasion force, the 2506 Brigade; underground leader Raimundo E. López, who resisted arrest; and students, such as Virgilio Campanería, Alberto Tapia, Rogelio González, and Bernardo Corrales as well as hundreds of others, died courageously by firing squad within the prison walls of those fortresses. By the spring of 1961, Cubans who openly opposed the Revolution or who posed a threat to Fidel were eliminated or were serving time in prisons throughout the island. Countless others died under mysterious circumstances.
Comandante Húber Matos, who fought in the Sierra Maestra in the 26th of July Movement, was arrested and received a 20-year sentence for exposing communists in Fidel’s government and resigning his revolutionary post in 1959. Camilo Cienfuegos died under mysterious circumstances in a plane crash after complaining to Fidel about the Maximum Leader’s crack down on other revolutionaries, merely because of a difference of opinion at the time of Matos’ arrest. Comandante Pedro Díaz Lanz, Fidel’s Chief of the Revolutionary Air Force, defected and safely fled Cuba for the same reason as Matos – namely, the growth of communist influence in Fidel Castro’s government.
The G2 political police and Fidel’s agents knew what was about to happen just prior to the fateful days of the Bay of Pigs invasion and apprehended thousands of Cubans without apparent cause.
“Plausible Deniability” Becomes U.S. Policy While the CIA is Disregarded
In May 2000, the American media reported that declassified U.S. documents revealed that the CIA informed President Kennedy prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion that they had confirmed the intelligence reports regarding the Soviets’ knowledge of the invasion plan. Yet, the president ordered the invasion to proceed, and at the last minute cancelled the two CIA planned air strikes of April 16 and 17, leaving half of Castro’s Cuban air force (FAR) still intact and operational.
President Kennedy also withheld air support to the invasion force during the landing at Playa Girón, sending 1400 Cuban exiles of the 2506 Brigade to certain destruction, as in fact occurred. The CIA planstrongly depended on the sorties of April 16 and 17 to completely destroy the FAR. Yet, President Kennedy, insisting on his political ploy of “plausible deniability,” cancelled them almost offhandedly, much to the consternation of CIA Chief of Operations Richard Bissell.
In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by Brigadier General David W. Gray, had previously conducted a feasibility study that estimated the landing force could maintain itself for at least four days if it had air support and a substantial uprising could be fomented and coordinated by the underground. The invasion force, though, required strong American backup. Two Cuban senior ex-military officers resigned from the Brigade after appraising the situation. They doubted America’s commitment to the mission given the antiquated equipment and slow-moving planes provided. Their criticism went unheeded.
The fact was clear to many military observers that without air support, a single Cuban FAR plane armed with a .50-caliber machine gun could destroy most of the landing force. The Cuban planes – Sea Furies and T-33 jets – could also strafe the invasion force on the beaches and annihilate the invaders.
President Kennedy made the decision to proceed despite the expressed concerns of military experts, and the lack of secrecy. In fact, the president had read a newspaper story stating that the invasion of Cuba was imminent. He was livid. “I can’t believe what I am reading,” Kennedy complained to Press Secretary Pierre Salinger, “Castro does not need spies. All he has to do is read our papers. It is all laid out for him.” Nevertheless, Kennedy rationalized his decision by stating to his presidential advisor, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., that it was better to “dump” the Brigade in Cuba; after all, “that is where they want to go.”
The CIA strongly advised a series of air strikes intended to destroy the FAR on the ground. President Kennedy not only withheld air support to the invasion force during the landing at Playa Girón in the Bay of Pigs but also cancelled the sorties of April 16 and 17, the second and third planned air strikes.
The first and only preemptive air strike that took place on April 15 was a success, despite Kennedy’s insistence that the aerial attack be made to look “Cuban.” Planes of the FAR were hit on the ground at San Antonio de los Baños, Camp Columbia (renamed Ciudad Libertad) in Havana, and the airport at Santiago de Cuba. Half of the entire FAR was destroyed, but the cancelling of the second and third air strikes left the remainder of Castro’s FAR intact and operational. So, two T-33 jets, three Sea Furies, and two B-26 planes proved to be more than enough to destroy the small flotilla of the 2506 Brigade that, like sitting ducks, was left helpless and without air support.
Initially, the invasion force bombers inflicted heavy damage on a communist convoy, destroying and stopping Castro’s motorized columns of military vehicles. This advance column was traveling down the Ciénaga de Zápata road loaded with troops, dispatched as the first line of defense against the invasion force at Playa Girón. Nevertheless, as predicted by military experts, the Cuban T-33 jets prevailed and destroyed the Brigade’s squadron of slow-moving B-26 planes.
The pilots of the B-26 exile planes did a remarkable job, but their bombers, defenseless against fighter planes, were unable to defend themselves from the FAR jets sent by Castro to intercept them. They were not even equipped with tail guns to fire at their pursuers. Twelve of the twenty-four B-26 bombers were shot down and demolished. Ten exile pilots died, along with four American volunteer pilots. The CIA was unable to deliver the air supremacy it had promised to the exile leaders because the President of the United States had torpedoed the original plans in order to make the operation look “Cuban” as part of his insistence on the “plausible deniability” component to the plan.
Furthermore, the landing site for the invasion force had been changed from Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs by the president, because of his “concerns” for the purported heavily populated Trinidad area and to avoid civilian casualties. The fact was that except for the city proper, the area was not heavily populated. This change also helped to seal the fate and bring about the utter defeat of the operation.
First, Trinidad had an excellent port facility for the landing of the invasion force, and for unloading supplies and armaments. These tasks appear simple, however, at the Bay of Pigs, the landing of men and equipment was delayed and hampered by unforeseen shallow water and reefs with catastrophic consequences for the amphibious landing force. Second, Trinidad was truly a bastion of counterrevolutionary activity and anti-Castro fervent, where a general uprising could have been a real possibility. Third, the Trinidad area was contiguous with the Escambray Mountains where a second wave of alzados, led by the intrepid Osvaldo Ramírez, was congregating for a great national liberation offensive against Fidel Castro. In case of defeat, the original invasion plan was for the exiles to join the rebels in the nearby, contiguous Escambray Mountains and aid the possible urban uprising in Trinidad.
For those reasons, CIA Chief of Operations Richard Bissell had wisely chosen a site near the historic city of Trinidad for the landing of the invasion. The news of the campesino (farmer) uprisings of 1960 and 1961 in this area had been censored on the island and all but ignored by the American media. Nevertheless, anti-communist rebels – made up of campesinos and guajiros (farmers and rural peasants) whose land was taken from them to form the farming cooperatives that would later become state-run farms – were still active in the area and could have assisted the invasion force. Elsewhere, the chance of an insurrection within the island was nil.
The Cuban communists were waiting. In anticipation of the invasion, over 100,000 Cubans from all walks of life were rounded up by the security police and held under arrest in prisons, schools, sports stadiums, and other available facilities to prevent the populace from joining or aiding the invasion force. Many in the underground were also arrested or were incommunicado. Internal uprisings and cooperation with the underground freedom fighters were no longer possible.
